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ABSTRACT
This paper introduces a novel graph-analytic approach for
detecting anomalies in network flow data called GraphPrints.
Building on foundational network-mining techniques, our
method represents time slices of traffic as a graph, then
counts graphlets—small induced subgraphs that describe lo-
cal topology. By performing outlier detection on the se-
quence of graphlet counts, anomalous intervals of traffic are
identified, and furthermore, individual IPs experiencing ab-
normal behavior are singled-out. Initial testing of Graph-
Prints is performed on real network data with an implanted
anomaly. Evaluation shows false positive rates bounded by
2.84% at the time-interval level, and 0.05% at the IP-level
with 100% true positive rates at both.
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1. INTRODUCTION
As government, industry, and private enterprises are in-
creasingly dependent on information technology, adequate
cyber defensive capabilities are of the utmost importance.
Currently, defending networked computing assets relies on
two primary mechanisms —automated signature-based de-
tection systems and manual analysis of cyber data. While
essential, these alone are insufficient. Signature-based detec-
tion methods (such as anti-virus software, intrusion detec-
tion systems, and firewalls) identify malicious traffic using
heuristics that are usually handcrafted; hence, such methods
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are only effective when encountering a previously analyzed
attack. In order to gain traction in understanding network
activity, security analysts turn to semi-manual investigation
of network data (e.g., firewall logs, packet capture data, net-
work flows, system logs), but are met with an abundance of
data and a scarcity of information; for example, flow data
alone from a small network will constitute 10-100 million
records per day. Anomaly detection methods, which seek to
single out unexpected events, propose a much needed com-
pliment to current methods, as they pinpoint noteworthy
events for further investigation and hold the promise of de-
tecting never-before-seen attacks.
In this paper, we introduce GraphPrints, a novel net-
work anomaly detection algorithm that uses graph analyt-
ics to identify qualitative changes in network traffic at the
IP and whole network level. We concentrate on network
flows—records of communication between a source and des-
tination IP address. More specifically, flows give the meta-
data (timestamp, IPs, ports, protocol, etc.) describing com-
munication between a pair of IPs over a small time window
(see inset table in Section 2). As such, network flows are a
primary data source for monitoring, diagnosing, and inves-
tigating network traffic. Our method divides network traffic
into time slices that are naturally represented as a graph.
More specifically, a graph G = (V,E) is defined as a set
of vertices, V (representing entities, IPs in our case), and
edges, E (representing relationships between pairs of ver-
tices—communication between IPs in our case.) The Graph-
Prints method mines graphlets—small, induced subgraphs,
which can be thought of as the building blocks of the graph
that describe the local topology—then performs outlier de-
tection to find those time windows of traffic that exhibit
uncharacteristic graphlet counts. In order to isolate the spe-
cific IPs engaging in unexpected traffic, for each vertex v of a
graph, GraphPrints also tracks the graphlet automorphism
orbits containing v (see Section 2.2), which characterizes the
role v’s IP plays in communication patterns. This simulta-
neous detection capability not only identifies time windows
of anomalous traffic, but also focuses the operator on those
IPs in the time window exhibiting uncharacteristic behavior.
Our hypothesis is that an unusual occurrence in network
traffic will produce a detectable change in graphlet counts.
To test this, we implement the multi-level detector on real
network traffic with an implanted anomaly—a host engag-
ing in bit torrent traffic —and report promising results high-
lighting GraphPrints’ potential (Section 3).
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The GraphPrints method builds on foundational work of
Milo et al. [3] and Przˇulj et al. [5] (among others) where
graphlets and automorphism orbits are used for network
classification, alignment, and comparison. To the best of
our knowledge, this is the first work to propose a network
anomaly detection algorithm for the dynamic graph setting
based on graphlets and automorphism orbits. We note that
the idea for multi-level anomaly detection on time-varying
graph data follows contributions of Bridges et al. [1], which
create a generative model for detection on synthetic graph
data at node, community, and whole graph levels. Addi-
tionally, a position paper of Halappanavar et al. [2] outlines
a network-of-network design for cyber security applications
and calls for graphlet analysis of flow data, but to our knowl-
edge no implementation of these ideas has yet been pursued.
2. GRAPHPRINTS WORKFLOW
In order to perform streaming anomaly detection based
on graph analytics, network flow data must be observed,
converted into a sequence of graphs, and fed to an algo-
rithm for identifying aberrations in the graph data. This
section outlines the steps used in our detection workflow
from tapping network communication, to identifying unex-
pected time windows of network activity.
To tap network flow data, we used ARGUS1 (the Audit
Record Generation
and Utilization
System), an open
source, real-time,
network flow mon-
itor. The table to
the rights contains
an example of a
single ARGUS flow
Time 09:58:32.912
Protocol tcp
SrcIP 192.168.1.100
SrcPort 59860
DstIP 173.16.100.10
DstPort 80
TotBytes 1695088
record. Only the fields used in this paper are displayed.
2.1 Representation of Flow Data as Graphs
We seek to represent network flow data in a given time in-
terval as a directed graph (digraph) G using a vertex for each
IP and letting flow records generate edges. To do this, we
create a preliminary graph H with vertices for IP addresses
and, naturally, an edge for each flow. More specifically, upon
observation of a flow record, a directed edge from the source
IP’s vertex to the destination IP’s vertex is created, and we
weight each edge by the flow’s total bytes record. Further-
more, we color an edge blue if at least one of the ports is
well known (i.e., less than 1024) and red if both ports are
not well known (1024 or greater).2 Since multiple flows can
occur between the same pair of IPs in the time interval, H is
a multi-digraph, meaning it admits multiple edges between
any pair of vertices, and we aggregate the multi-edges to
create the desired graph, G. Specifically, for each source
vertex i and destination vertex j of H, let Bi,j (Ri,j) be the
sum of edge weights, total bytes, over the blue (red) edges
from i to j. If Bi,j > Ri,j (Ri,j ≥ Bi,j), create a blue (red)
edge from i to j in G. Thus our final graph, G, has colored,
1http://qosient.com/
2The most common TCP and UDP traffic will have a desti-
nation (or source) port of a well-known port number, with
the source (or destination) port being a randomly chosen
“high” port number. Traffic that has both ports outside of
this range is typically either a less-common protocol, or a
common protocol configured in an uncommon way.
Figure 1: Graphlet & Orbit Counting Example
directed, and unweighted edges representing the collection
of flows observed in the time interval.
2.2 Graphlet & Orbit Vectors
To capture a network’s behavior over time, we examine
graphlets—small, connected, induced subgraphs of the net-
work. Graphlets are an important network characteristic
because they capture the local topology of the network. For
instance, observing many stars or many paths (see Figure 1)
provides an understanding of the overall structure of the
network [3, 5]. Given a graph Gi from time window i, we
count the occurrences of all graphlets up to size k, and store
these graphlet counts in a graphlet degree vector, denoted gi.
See Figure 1 for an example graph Gi with graphlet degree
vector gi. The notion of graphlets is easily extended to in-
clude colored vertices and edges as well as directed edges,
as is our current interest. In this case, topologically equiv-
alent graphlets with different colorings are considered dif-
ferent. While coloring allows encoding of contextual infor-
mation, the number of graphlets grows combinatorially with
the number of colors, which can pose issues of computational
cost or memory usage.
To capture a vertex’s behavior over time, we will examine
graphlet automorphism orbits.3 The automorphism orbits of
a graph are sets of vertices that are symmetric in the graph.
Intuitively, the automorphism orbits are the different roles
a vertex can fill in that graph; for instance, a star has two
automorphism orbits—one for the center vertex and one for
the leaf vertices. The orbit vector of v is a vector whose
entries are the counts of the graphlet automorphism orbits
in which v participates. Given a graph Gi and a vertex v,
we denote the orbit vector of v in Gi as a
i
v (see Figure 1).
Orbit vectors are useful characteristics because they describe
a vertex’s extended neighborhood in a graph. For instance,
a vertex who appears in the center of many stars is likely
different from a vertex who appears always as a leaf.
To summarize the workflow up to this point, network flow
data is observed in near real time, and is represented as
a sequence of graphs, G1, G2, . . . . For a given graph Gi,
graphlet vectors gi characterize the network at the graph-
level (i.e., changes over the whole time-window of network
activity) and the orbit vectors aiv characterize the network
at the vertex level. As an analogy, graphlet vectors are like
handprints and orbit vectors are like fingerprints, hence the
term GraphPrints. There are several available tools to count
3 The automorphism orbits of G = (V,E) form a partition
of V where vertices u and v are in the same orbit iff there
exists a graph automorphism f : V → V that takes u to v.
graphlets. In this study, we used FanMod4 [8]. We note that
in the FanMod implementation there is no extra computa-
tion to count graphlet automorphism orbits as this is already
a step in the process of graphlet counting.
2.3 Anomaly Detection Framework
In order to perform detection at the graph level, we fit
a multivariate Gaussian to the set of previously observed
graphlet degree vectors, {gi}ni=1 using a technique that is
robust to outliers. Because our historical network data may
contain (discovered or undiscovered) anomalies, we use the
Minimum Covariance Determinant (MCD) method, which
can identify the “best fit” mean and covariance in the pres-
ence of up to 50% outliers. More specifically, the user pro-
vides a number h between n/2 and n of pure (i.e., non-
anomalous) data points, and the algorithm finds the ellip-
soid of least volume that covers h points.5 This is equivalent
to fitting a Gaussian distribution to h of the data points, and
omitting n − h outliers; hence our distribution will not be
skewed by up to (n − h)/n percent of arbitrarily bad data
points. Upon receipt of the next time-window’s graphlet
vector, gn+1 we compute the Mahalanobis distance,
6 which
scores how anomalous the new vector is—high scores for
very anomalous data, low scores for relatively common data,
according to the Gaussian distribution. We reference inter-
ested readers to algorithmic details of MCD by the creators,
Rousseeuw et al. [6]. Our implementation used the SciKit-
Learn MinCovDet module [4].7
To demonstrate the usefulness of orbit vectors in IP flow
analysis, we characterize normal vectors via an unsupervised
clustering algorithm (k-means), and use a vector’s distance
to cluster centers as an anomaly score. The k-means al-
gorithm is an unsupervised learning algorithm that, given
positive integer k, partitions the data into k clusters via a
greedy method. To build a detector, we first learn the cluster
centers (centroids) by running k-means on a set of observed
data points. Next, given a (newly observed) orbit vector, we
determine its anomaly score by considering its distance to
the nearest centroid. In this study, we used the gap statistic
to choose the value of k used in k-means [7]. Details of our
detection experiment and results are given in Section 3.
3. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP & RESULTS
For a demonstration dataset, network flow data was col-
lected from the main network switch of a small office building
in a campus environment, during a typical workday. This
traffic includes both wired and wireless subnets, as well as
a small datacenter with many virtual machines (VMs), on
a separate NAT-ed network. This collection of flows serves
as ambient traffic. To create a known anomaly, the ambi-
ent traffic is combined with a separately-recorded session of
bit torrent flows from a single host. As bit torrent partic-
ipation is disallowed on the office network, the bit torrent
4http://theinf1.informatik.uni-jena.de/motifs/
5Once the ellipsoid, E = {x : (x − µ)tQ(x − µ) ≤ 1} (µ ∈
Rp, Q ∈ Rp×p positive definite), is found, the corresponding
Gaussian has mean µ, and covariance Σ = Q−1.
6Given mean µ and covariance Σ, the Mahalanobis distance
is defined of x is (x−µ)tΣ−1(x−µ) and is (inversely mono-
tonically) equivalent to finding the vector’s p-value.
7http://scikit-learn.org/stable/modules/generated/sklearn.
covariance.MinCovDet.html
traffic should be abnormal. Furthermore, we expect bit tor-
rent traffic to demonstrate a similar topology to other, more
concerning types of traffic, such as peer-to-peer botnet com-
munication or distributed denial of service attacks, which
would be problematic to generate in a real network setting.
To implant the bit torrent traffic the flows’ timestamps were
offset, and the host and router IP addresses mapped to their
analogues in the building’s subnet. Finally, the bit torrent
flows are shuffled into the ambient traffic respecting the time
sequence of all the data. In total, this dataset included
10,507 IP addresses of which 2,795 IP addresses are within
the building’s subnets. These included 151 IPs on the eth-
ernet network, 491 IPs on the wireless network, and 2,153
IPs in the datacenter.
As discussed in Section 2.1, we now represent the data as
a sequence of graphs, (Gi), with time windows of 31 seconds
with one second overlap. In total, we observed 350 graphs,
averaging 1,265 nodes and 4,901 edges per graph of which
76% were red indicating more data was sent between high
port connections than otherwise. Additionally, there were on
average 4,929 non-empty flows per time interval; hence, most
colored edges represent a single flow. Zooming in on the bit
torrent traffic, we find 40 intervals (no. 278-317 in Figure
2) in which at least a single flow was attributable to bit
torrent traffic. Of these, the first 24 time windows contained
roughly 15% bit torrent flows, while the latter 16 intervals
had only contained 2% bit torrent flows. For testing, we
consider these 24 intervals true positives at the graph level,
and the vertex engaging in the bit torrent activity during
those intervals a true positive at the node level. As the goal
of an anomaly detector is to pinpoint abnormal events, we
consider a substantial change in network activity to be a true
positive, even if not necessarily malicious. Additionally, we
are unaware of what, possibly bizarre, activity is present in
the rest of the data.
Graphlets of size three and corresponding automorphism
orbits are counted to create the sequence of graphlet degree
vectors gi and a sequence of orbit count vectors for each ver-
tex v, aiv (see Section 2.2). Using the MCD algorithm (Sec-
tion 2.3), we fit the initial Gaussian to the first 150 graphlet
vectors. For each subsequent vector, we score anomalous-
ness using Mahalanobis distance and re-fit the Gaussian to
include the new data point. In this study, h = 0.85n. See
Figure 2, which gives a plot of the anomaly score for each
time window. A suggested threshold is displayed in red, and
is chosen to maximize the known true-positives while mini-
mizing the number of other points over the threshold. Since
the known anomalies are easily discriminated from the ma-
jority of the traffic, such a threshold obtains perfect true pos-
itive rate, zero false negatives, and we see 5 of 176 unknown
anomalies detected. This bounds our graph-level false posi-
tive rate by 2.84%. Although we have not proven causality,
initial investigation of these unknown anomalies revealed an
IP scan of a VM subnet; hence, these may indeed be true
(but previously unknown) positives. Further investigation
of these detected anomalies will be included in future work.
For node-level detection, we randomly sample 40 IPs with
probability proportional to their vertex’s occurrence in the
data, then cluster their orbit vectors’ from the first 150 time
intervals. As described in section 2.3, we use the gap statistic
and choose k = 5 for K-means clustering. For the remaining
200 time intervals the distance of these 40 IPs’ orbit vectors
to the nearest cluster centroid is plotted on the top line of
Figure 2: Graph-Level Detection Results
Note: Log-Mahalanobis distance of graphlet vectors
shown.Threshold chosen to maximize known anomalies, while
minimizing detection of other points. True-positive rate = 100%.
False positive rate = 2.84%.
Figure 3 (blue dots), while just below, the red dots represent
the nearest-centroid distances of orbit vectors corresponding
to the known anomalous vertex. As in the graph-level analy-
sis, an appropriate threshold that detects all known anoma-
lies is indicated by the green bars. We note that only 4 of
8000 vectors from the unknown time intervals are detected
as anomalous, bounding our false positive rate by 0.05%.
Furthermore, the clear disparity in scores exhibited by the
known anomalies permits zero false negatives at the node
level also.
These preliminary results show that graphlet vectors can
indicate when anomalies occur in the network, and orbit
vectors can identify where these anomalies occur.
4. CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
Our evaluation of GraphPrints exhibited 2.84% and 0.05%
false positive rates at the graph and node levels, respectively,
with 100% true positive rate at both. This confirms that
noteworthy changes in network traffic are identifiable using
only counts of 3-graphlets / orbits. Furthermore, the discov-
ery of unexpected anomalies illuminates an important area
of future research for GraphPrints—how to trace a detected
event to (1) particular graphlet / orbit counts, and (2) the
specific network traffic that is abnormal. As the Graph-
Prints method admits colored nodes, important contextual
information—such as an IP’s membership in a known sub-
net, ASN, or country code—can be encoded via node col-
oring, and we expect future inclusion of this information
to yield more informative results. Finally, we believe fur-
ther investigation of the node-level clusters will allow us to
characterize different types of user behavior; for example,
perhaps one cluster is comprised of the orbit vectors associ-
ated with using email, while another those of web browsing.
In summary, this work presents a graph analytic method
with promising initial results for analyzing, detecting, and
characterizing network flow data, where noteworthy changes
in network behavior are identifiable at multiple levels with
exceptionally low false positive rates.
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